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Syntax
David Adger∗
Syntax is the cognitive capacity of human beings that allows us to connect linguistic
meaning with linguistic form. The study of syntax is a huge ﬁeld that has generated
a great deal of empirical and theoretical work over the decades. This article outlines
why understanding our syntactic capacity is important to cognitive science in
general and why the data of syntactic research is to be taken seriously. It then
provides an overview of a number of broad ﬁndings about the character of the
syntax of human language, including evidence for abstract constituent structure,
core properties of constituents, the importance of functional categories, the link
between syntactic structure and meaning, and the range of types of syntactic
dependencies, including dependencies of form, dependencies of position, and
dependencies that create new meanings. © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Cognitive Science
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Syntax is the cognitive capacity of human beingsthat allows us to connect linguistic meaning with
linguistic form. The study of syntax has generated a
great deal of empirical and theoretical knowledge over
the decades.1–4 Here, I outline why understanding our
syntactic capacity is important to cognitive science,
and why the data of syntactic research is to be taken
seriously. I then turn to a necessarily brief discussion
of results that have emerged from syntactic work over
the last half century or so. A striking fact, perhaps
not obvious to those outside the field, is that there
is a great deal of consensus as to the core problems,
generalizations and range of solutions, even across
widely differing syntactic theories.
I focus on syntax here, not language in gen-
eral. Researchers outside of linguistics typically take
the term language to have a common-sense meaning,
connecting it to its functions in communication,
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sociality, creativity, cultural transmission, thinking etc.
While these functions are fascinating and important, it
is possible to investigate the syntax of language while
leaving questions of its functions aside. Without an
understanding of the nature of the capacity, questions
as to how (or whether) its function has shaped that
capacity are shots in the dark.
WHY IS SYNTACTIC THEORY
RELEVANT TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE?
Sentences (and other expressions) of human languages
have structure relevant to their meaning and pronunci-
ation, and syntactic research attempts to uncover that
structure. Understanding the results of that research is
therefore key to understanding language as a whole.
This structure is why Anson bit Lilly does not mean
the same as Lilly bit Anson, even though both expres-
sions consist of the same words. It is also why
the words her and she differ in pronunciation, even
though they refer to the same individual and play a
close to identical semantic role, in sentences likeAnson
believes her to be vicious and Anson believes that she
is vicious.
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One might think that, in the cases just men-
tioned, what is relevant is merely the order of the
words, which might be sufficient to determine both
meaning and pronunciation. To see that order will not
suffice, compare Anson bit Lilly with Lilly was bitten.
Here, Lilly precedes rather than follows bite, but it has
the same meaning with respect to bite as it does in
Anson bit Lilly: in both cases, Lilly suffers the bite.
At a slightly more abstract level, take the sentences
Lilly fears Jasper and Lilly amuses Jasper. In the first,
the individual who is feeling the emotion is denoted by
the word that precedes the verb, while in the latter, the
individual feeling the emotion follows the verb. Such
effects, where meaning is divorced from word order,
are ubiquitous in language.
It would be trivial to define an artificial lan-
guage that defines semantic roles on the basis of order
(like, for example, standard translations of English
into predicate logic do). A system like that would just
match cognitive semantic concepts relevant to linguis-
tic meaning to surface properties of the ordering of
words; however, no human language works like this.
Another intuitively simple system would be
one where all the grammatical relationships between
words are confined to words that are next to each
other. However, human languages do not work like
that either.
For example, in the general case, the form of a
verb is not determined by the adjacent words. This is
why in The girls from Paris are singing, the auxiliary
verb form of be appears as the plural version are and
not the singular is, even though are is directly adjacent
to the singular noun Paris but distant from the plural
noun girls. Compare this with Paris is beautiful, which
shows that Paris can trigger a singular form of the
verb. The examples differ because Paris is in a different
structural relationship to the verb in the two cases,
even though it is adjacent to the verb in both.
Such simple examples are important because
they are general across human languages: no language
that we know of has a general rule that will trigger
verbal agreement in number with the equivalent of
Paris in The girls from Paris are singing; simple con-
tiguity is never the precondition for this kind of verb
agreement. Even more interesting is that speech errors
often give rise to such agreement (‘attraction errors’5),
but these are never generalized by children learning
the language to a rule that causes the verb to agree
with the adjacent noun. If they were so generalized
then the result would be a paradigm that looks as
follows, with the reverse of the usual English pattern
in (a–d) but the standard English pattern in (e–h) (I
present data from now on numbered as is standard
in linguistics, with a * to signify an empirical claim
that the sentence is not acceptable in the language in
question. The Question of Data discusses the nature
of syntactic data in more depth):
(1) .a. The girls from Paris is singing
b. *The girls from Paris are singing
c. The girl from the Western Isles are singing
d. *The girl from the Western Isles is singing
e. Paris is beautiful
f. *Paris are beautiful
g. *The Western Isles is beautiful
h. The Western Isles are beautiful
Not only does no variety of English work like
this, no variety of any human language works like this.
From the perspective of cognitive science, such
observations are fundamental: they show that the
most obvious surface properties of words (their order
and their contiguity) are not properties that are
important in how human language negotiates the
relationship between form and meaning. If order and
contiguity were the organizing principles of language,
then, given that agreement is particularly vulnerable
in language change,6 and attraction errors exist,5 lan-
guages should drift toward an adjacency based agree-
ment system. However, they do not. Rather human
language learners ignore the adjacency relationship as
a potential hypothesis and successfully learn that even
distant nouns can determine the verb form:
(2) The girls from Paris that the cat scratched in the
house are singing.
This entails that human language learners are
biased towards structural conditions on grammatical
dependencies and against surface conditions7–9.
The result that structural not surface properties
are fundamental to human language, stable since the
1950s in linguistics, has a great deal of psychological
and neuropsychological confirmation. Neuroscientfic
investigation has consistently found that there are
different patterns of brain activation when humans
learn artificial languages which are based on structure
versus surface order.10
THE QUESTION OF DATA
Psychologists and syntacticians work on very different
kinds of data. For the most part, the data that
syntacticians work with will have medium to large
effect sizes (Cohen’s d11): that is, the mean difference
in a measured behavioral reaction to a stimulus
132 © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Cognitive Science published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 6, March/Apr i l 2015
WIREs Cognitive Science Syntax
divided by the mean standard deviation is much
greater than 0.5. Effect size is a measure of the strength
of a phenomenon and Cohen defines medium to large
effect sizes as those that a trained researcher can see
without applying statistical analysis.12 Sprouse and
Almeida12 show that, for a large and representative
sample of syntactic data (collected via traditional,
informal methods), formal experimental investigation
converges with the informally collected data (97%
of the relevant phenomena covered in a graduate
textbook13 and 95% of the English data in a decade of
Linguistic Inquiry articles). They attribute this in part
to the fact that the data used to make scientific claims
about the syntax of human languages, in general, have
medium to large effect sizes.
To get a sense of the issues, take a simple set of
sentences like the following:
(3) a. I met someone from New York at the confer-
ence.
b. From New York I met someone at the confer-
ence.
c. At the conference I met someone from New
York.
The empirical task the syntactician sets
him/herself is to determine whether (b) or (c) is
most closely related to (a). Without performing any
statistical test, it’s clear that (c) is related to (a) more
closely than (b) is, and, in fact, (b) is not acceptable
as a sentence of English with the same meaning as (a),
while (c) is. This is a typical datum in syntax, and in
fact it can be used as an argument in a fairly sophisti-
cated chain of reasoning about what the structure of
(a) is. The strength of the effect size is evident to any
speaker of English.
This data is exactly the kind of data that most
syntacticians work with on a daily basis, and the
strength of the effect is so clear that most syntacti-
cians feel justified in not subjecting it to statistical
testing,12–15 although this view is not universal.16 Fur-
ther, the speed with which this kind of data can be
amassed has allowed syntacticians to build a large and
solid empirical understanding of syntax across many
languages. For example, translating the sentences
above into other languages, perhaps languages with
quite different grammatical properties from English,
can quickly lead to an understanding of how consis-
tent or variable the phenomenon is, and to what extent
it correlates with various other properties.
Does this mean that syntacticians should not per-
form experiments to test the strength of their claims?
Certainly not. In some cases the effect size is not
clear to the researcher. This can be tackled via more
careful design of the materials to weed out pragmatic
or semantic factors that interfere but sometimes data
will simply not be considered to have a strong enough
effect size to be used in theoretical or analytical argu-
mentation. Experimental approaches are sometimes
necessary.17–19 Similar comments are true for corpus
data, which have advantages in providing frequency
information, but disadvantages in the rarity of the cru-
cial examples.14
The lack of statistical and other information
about data provenance and analysis does raise a
communication difficulty: psychologists looking at
syntax papers and seeking the kind of statistical
information they are used to in their own discipline
will generally find it lacking. However, the field itself
clearly has mechanisms for ensuring the solidity of
the data that it uses to build theoretical claims on,
and as Sprouse and Almeida’s work shows, the vast
majority of the data used in theoretical argumentation
are replicable and reliable, because the size of the
effect is immediately and easily checked. Different
disciplines have different methods of establishing their
core phenomena. Judgments of acceptability applied
to well designed materials in syntax have been crucial
in building a very rich base of cross-linguistically valid
knowledge about syntactic structure.
IMPORTANT FINDINGS IN SYNTAX
InWhy Is Syntactic Theory Relevant to Cognitive Sci-
ence?we saw that structure, not surface order or conti-
guity, is relevant to how meaning and form are related
in human language. An equally important empirical
point about the meaning-form relationship is that it is
astoundingly vast: a speaker of a language, who has
acquired a finite set of words in that language, can
link the forms of sentences in the language to their
meanings over a range of experiences so large that it
seems senseless to place an arbitrary limit on it. Corti-
cal and psychological evidence suggests that learning
the grammar of a language is complete by puberty.20,21
It follows that speakers acquire a productive means to
link form and meaning (a grammar) over a practically
unbounded range, from a bounded set of experiences.
The question is how to model such a capacity.
Perhaps the major insight of generative syntax
is that a human grammar can be modeled by a finite
mathematical function. This function, in the early
years of investigation, was taken to be fairly complex,
modeling a number of levels of linguistic description,
and leading to a characterization of human linguis-
tic knowledge that seemed highly particular.22–24
The general framework, in its many incarnations,
allowed an explosive growth in empirical knowledge
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about the syntax of languages as well as increasing
depth of analysis and a series of well understood
high-level generalizations about phenomena. More
recent models have radically reduced in complexity as
the empirical generalizations have become clearer,25
allowing far less innate structure to be imputed to the
linguistic system.26
We can divide the high level generalizations
discovered over the years into two broad classes:
generalizations to do with the shape and meanings
of structures and generalizations about dependencies
between elements within these structures.
The Shape of Grammar: Constituency
Constituent structure is the grouping of linguistic
elements together to the exclusion of other elements,
establishing another dimension of organization than
the surface order of the elements in a sentence. Usually
this is represented as either a bracketting, or a tree-like
structure:
(4) a. [ A [ [ B C ] D ] ]
b.
A
B C D
The expressions grouped into a single con-
stituent are said to be sisters, while the overarching
constituent that contains them is termed the mother.
Typically, it is assumed that there is information spec-
ified at the juncture points in the tree as well as at the
terminal nodes of the tree. This means that these nodes
are labeled in some fashion. For example:
(5) a. [A′ A [D′ [B′ B C ] D ] ]
b.
A´
A D´
B´
B C
D
Labeling is distinct from constituency, and
indeed some approaches in syntax eschew it,27 pre-
ferring to specify all the relevant information in the
terminal nodes.
Evidence for Constituent Structure
(i) Constituents provide a description of distributional
patterns in languages that allows linguists to capture
a wide range of facts about particular languages via
a condensed set of constituent structure types; this is
what allows us to capture the fact that a pronoun
like she and a phrase like David and Anson’s sleepy
cat are intersubstitutable in English in a wide range
of syntactic contexts (they are all characterizable as
a constituent with the same kind of node label),
while at the same time capturing the fact that there
is no word that is intersubstitutable with, say, and
Anson’s sleepy which is a subsequence of David
and Anson’s sleepy cat but not a constituent of it.
Such distributional generalizations were the initial
motivation for constituent structure.28
(ii) Many overarching syntactic generalizations
that govern sentence structure are typically statable in
terms of constituents. For example, in many Germanic
languages, such as Swedish, the verb (bolded in (6))
in a main clause must be preceded by exactly one
constituent (Holmberg29 example 1):a
(6)
The cases in (6) are representative examples of a
phenomenon which is best characterized by requiring
that the tense marking auxiliary verb (have) appears
after the first constituent of the sentence.
More generally, a wide range of syntactic gen-
eralizations are sensitive to constituents (see any syn-
tax textbook for a discussion13,30,31). For example,
the agreement phenomenon mentioned inWhy Is Syn-
tactic Theory Relevant to Cognitive Science? is cap-
tured by saying that the verb agrees with the whole
constituent the girls from Paris rather than the adja-
cent noun Paris. Such generalizations are established
within languages and typically converge on identical
assignments of constituent structure (though there are
cases of interesting mismatches32–34), and the meth-
ods for determining constituency are applicable across
languages.
(iii) Constituents display both semantic and
phonological unity to the extent that theories of
sentence semantics35 and phonology36 make crucial
use of them. Relatedly, assigning independently moti-
vated constituent structures correctly predicts a range
of semantic ambiguities without the need for special
stipulations. For example, it is possible to modify a
noun with an adjective as in sleepy cats and it is also
possible to conjoin two nouns into a single constituent
as in cats and dogs. It follows with no further stip-
ulation that the phrase sleepy cats and dogs will be
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ambiguous, since that sequence of words will be con-
sistent with two assignments of constituent structure
(I assume a binary constituency here, although that is
not relevant to the argument):
(7)
sleepy
cats
and dogs
sleepy cats and dogs
In the structure on the left the adjective sleepy
modifies the whole structure cats and dogs while in
the tree on the right it modifies just cats, capturing the
ambiguity and the natural position to place pauses
if a speaker wishes to prosodically disambiguate
the phrase. These kinds of phenomena are perva-
sive and constituency provides an elegant way of
capturing them.
(iv) Psychological evidence abounds that these
constituent structures (or at least some of them) are
relevant in sentence processing: the structural priming
phenomenon,37,38 perception experiments,39–41 relat-
edness judgments,42 slips of the tongue effects43 etc.
Properties of Constituent Structure
(i) Current views of syntax take the number of sub-
units of a constituent to be severely limited. The stan-
dard position within the Minimalist framework44 is
that constituents are uniformly binary (a position that
is held also within Categorial Grammar approaches),
but other frameworks also have severely restricted
branching (although some take structural complex-
ity to reside in conceptual structure, rather than in
syntax45). The fundamental empirical reason for this is
that models of the data that incorporate highly layered
structures are empirically more successful than those
that do not. For example, in English, it is possible to
elide constituents containing the verb, as can be seen
from the grammaticality of the sentences in (8). This
is easily captured if the structure is roughly that in (9),
and the generalization about elision is that you can
elide constituents:
(8) a. Lilly might have been running.
b. Lilly might have been.
c. Lilly might have.
d. Lilly might.
(9) [ Lilly [ might [ have [ been [ running ] ] ] ] ]
(ii) It is also a close to consensus position that
word order is to be factored out from a specification of
hierarchical structure.46,47 That is, constituent struc-
ture is independent of the order of the elements in that
structure, so the two trees in (10) are equivalent ways
of representing the same constituent:
(10) A
X Y
A
Y X
The strongest argument for this comes from the
elegant analysis it gives of aspects of cross-linguistic
variation. Consider the English sentence:
(11) Anson said Lilly bit Michael.
In Japanese, this translates to the equivalent
of (12):
(12) Anson-wa Lilly-ga Michael-o kanda-to itta.
Anson Lilly Michael bit said
‘Anson said Lilly bit Michael.’
For both languages, the evidence is that the con-
stituency is identical.13,48 We thus have the following
constituent trees where the structure is exactly the
same, but the order is reversed under the nodes F
and G:
(13)
Anson F
said
Lilly G
bit Michael
Anson-wa F
Lilly-ga G
Michael-o kanda-to
itta
Even those languages which have been
claimed to have extremely free word order (for
example the Pama-Nguyan language Warlpiri or the
Kiowa-Tanoan language Kiowa), with no obvious evi-
dence for constituent structure of the sort discussed
here, have turned out not to involve random per-
mutations on a very flat structure. Contrary to the
original proposal of Hale,49 detailed empirical work
has shown that these languages have clear hierarchy
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effects, suggesting constituent structure.50,51 However
the debate is still open as to how to model these
empirical findings.
(iii) The third important consensus position on
properties of constituent structure is the idea that
the type of a constituent is predictable from the type
of a constituent contained within it (in the simplest
case a single word, or subpart of a word, called the
head). Evidence for this is that, within a constituent,
there is usually a single element which is of primary
importance in determining the grammatical behavior
of the whole unit. For example, in the girls from Paris,
the word girls determines the agreement on the verb,
and so is the head. Another kind of example is that the
grammaticality or ungrammaticality of the phrase ate
the mouse in a context is more or less identical to the
grammaticality or ungrammaticality of the word ate
in that context, so ate is the head.
Specifiers and Complements
It will be useful here to introduce a simple piece of
technical terminology:
(14) a. If a phrasal constituent is the sister of a head,
it is said to be the complement of that head
b. If a phrasal constituent is the sister of the
mother of a head, it is said to be the specifier
of that head
Simplifying somewhat, a phrasal constituent is
just a constituent that has internal structure (i.e. has
further constituents internal to it). In a simple tree, we
can talk about the various sections of the tree with
respect to the head as follows:
(15)
Specifier
...
Head Complement
...
These two technical terms turn out to be useful in
discussing important recurring structural relationships
found in human languages.
Functional Categories in Constituent Structure
The proposal that all constituents have a head has led
to an analysis of sentences as phrases headed by an
item that marks the grammatical tense (whether the
sentence is past, present, or non-tensed), often simply
notated T, so that a simple (emphatic) sentence like
Lilly did jump looks as follows, where T is (the label
of) the head of the sentence and is pronounced as did.
The specifier of T (that is, the sister of the mother of T)
is the traditional subject of the sentence (Lilly, in this
case), and T’s complement is the constituent whose
head is the verb jump (as is standard, I use a triangle
in the tree to gloss over irrelevant structure; see How
Meaning Links to Structure—Verbs for discussion of
the verb phrase). Traditionally, the whole sentence
is also taken to bear the label T, although other
possibilities have been and are being explored.8
(16) T
Lilly T
T V
jump
Categories like T are known as functional cate-
gories, and have become extremely important in mod-
ern syntactic research52:
(i) Functional categories are linguistically dis-
tinct from the categories that distinguish content
words (usually called lexical categories, for example,
cat N, jump V and happy A(djective)). The lexical
categories N, V and A distinguish classes of con-
tent words, each class having many members. Func-
tional categories label far fewer expressions (e.g. the
(C)omplementizer category introduced below has only
three members in English) whichmeans that particular
tokens of functional categories are frequent in contrast
to tokens of lexical categories, with implications for
language acquisition.53
(ii) There are a number of linguistic differ-
ences between functional categories and lexical cat-
egories. Phonologically, the expressions labeled by
functional categories tend to be shorter, non-stress
bearing and often have particular sets of phono-
logical constraints imposed upon them (such as a
restricted set of consonants or vowels.54 They are
also often affixes, attaching to lexical categories (e.g.
the affix -ed marking past tense attaching to the
verb in jumped). Semantically, they specify grammat-
ically relevant meanings such as tense, aspect, defi-
niteness, plurality, etc. These are rigid, fixed points
in meaning,55 specified using well-understood logical
techniques. In contrast, content words like jump are
semantically vague and resist complete analysis using
logical techniques.
(iii) Expanding beyond these domains, func-
tional categories and lexical categories are differ-
ently affected in language disorders,56 language
acquisition,57 and neurophysiological response.58
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The widespread acceptance of functional cate-
gories, plus the consensus on limited (perhaps binary)
branching structure, can lead to a fair amount of com-
plexity in syntactic representations: it is not untypical
to see tree representations spanning whole pages of
articles. However, this complexity should not be con-
fused with abstractness. In a full-fledged analysis, each
functional category has a meaning, so each is semanti-
cally concrete. Most have either direct phonological
expression in the relevant syntactic position, or are
in a syntactic dependency with another element that
phonologically expresses the particular value of the
category. For example, in the tree above, T marks the
temporal semantics and is pronounced as did, but the
overt expression of T can also appear as an inflection
on the verb (for example -ed), possibly non-contiguous
with T (as in Lilly often jumped).
The whole tense constituent (sometimes called
TP, for Tense Phrase on analogy with VP, for Verb
Phrase) is the sister of another functional category, the
complementizer (C). C may be overtly expressed in
English when a sentence combines with a verb:
(17) a. I know that Lilly did jump.
b. I asked if Lilly did jump.
Whether the embedded sentence Lilly did jump
expresses a fact or asks a question is marked overtly
in English by the distinction between the complemen-
tizers if and that.
Functional categories tend to be strictly hier-
archically ordered with respect to each other. For
example, taking that to be a C, and emphatic did to
be T, we find only one order is possible, captured by
requiring C to be hierarchically superior to T:
(18) a. I know that Lilly did jump.
b. *I know did Lilly that jump.
(19) C
that T
Lilly T
did V
jump
Evidence from distribution, semantics, con-
stituency and order has been used to establish a
number of functional categories that appear in
both sentences and noun phrases in many different
languages.59 For example, in the noun phrase in
English, a demonstrative (Dem) like those occurs
before a numeral (Num) like three, which in turn
occurs before an adjective like big:
(20) a. Those three big oranges
b. *Big three those oranges
As we have seen, hierarchy is distinct from order,
predicting the existence of languages that reverse
the English order, while maintaining the hierarchy.
Such languages are common; for example, the phrase
translated into Thai would be:
(21) sôm jàj sa˘am-lûuk nán
orange big three those
This finding can be modeled using a hierarchical
structure as follows:
(22) Dem
those Num
three Adj
big N
oranges
Dem
Num
Adj
N
soˆm
ja`j
saˇam-luˆuk
na´n
The lexical categories of noun and verb are
surmounted by a (hierarchically) ordered sequence
of functional categories carrying logical semantic
information. Such sequences are termed Extended
Projections.60 There is a great deal of debate about the
richness, hierarchical order and universality of these
functional categories, but there is a strong consensus
that they are required.
How Meaning Links to Structure—Verbs
We now turn to the meanings associated with lexi-
cal categories, restricting our attention to verbs. Verbs
typically occur with noun phrases that are semanti-
cally connected to them: for example, a verb like jump
has a single semantic participant, expressed by the
noun phrase the cat, in the cat jumped. A number of
important generalizations have been discovered about
these verb noun phrase relations over the years. We
will discuss just one: the noun phrase that denotes the
agent of an event is hierarchically superior to the noun
phrase that denotes a non-agent.61 In the example,
Anson bit Lilly, the subject Anson is external to the
constituent bit Lilly, hence hierarchically superior to
Lilly, and it is interpreted as the agent of the event.
This correlation between semantic roles and syntactic
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hierarchy is very strong, holding across verb classes
and across languages, with apparent exceptions reduc-
ing to independent factors.
One way that this generalization has been
embedded in theoretical models is to tie the meaning
of Agent to a functional category that specifies that
the subject is the Agent of an event denoted by the
verb phrase. This functional category is hierarchically
sandwiched between V and T in the extended pro-
jection. This proposal decomposes the verb into two
syntactic components, the contentful lexical verb bite
and a functional element notated v (pronounced ‘little
v’). The semantic function of v is to add an agent to
the verb and approaches have been developed which
execute this in different ways62–64:
(23) T
T[past] v
N
Anson
v
v V
bite N
Lilly
The meaning of v is specified so that Anson
is interpreted as the agent of bite Lilly, while T
marks this event as taking place before the speech
time (as is common, I have notated the fact that we
have a past tense here by writing [past] next to the
category T). I return below to how the word order is
captured. Empirical arguments have been given that
in various languages v is phonologically expressed
(e.g. the Mayan language, Chol65), although this is
an ongoing area of investigation, and much is still
unclear. An alternative to this view takes the verb
itself to specify that the participant that is interpreted
as the Agent is to be placed syntactically higher, so
that the relevant generalization is one about the way
that information specified of a word maps to syntactic
information.66–68
Further work, following on from Dowty’s early
investigations,69 has connected the interpretation of
the subject and the object to aspectual properties of
the verb.70 The more general outcome of this research
is that there is only a small number of basic event types
and evidence that these correlate tightly with a small
number of basic syntactic structural types.71
To get a flavor of this, consider the possi-
ble syntactic positions for noun phrases that denote
participants of the event denoted by a verb (these are
usually called the verb’s arguments). If the verb has
two arguments (traditionally, these are termed tran-
sitive verbs), as in (23) above, there is no ambiguity
about which is which, given the meaning associated
with v and its syntactic position relative to V.However,
if a verb has just one argument (i.e. it is intransitive),
then there are two available syntactic positions for that
one argument: either where Lilly is placed in (23), or
where Anson is placed. Further, each of these is associ-
ated, by hypothesis, with a meaning: the element that
combines with the constituent headed by v is associ-
ated with an Agent meaning, while the sister of the
verb is not. We predict two kinds of intransitive verb:
(24) v
N
Agent
v
v jump[V]
v
v V
fall[V] N
Non-Agent
The two classes of intransitive verb in (24)
(termed unergative and unaccusative verbs) have been
empirically recognized since the 1970s72 and there is a
wealth of linguistic evidence that they are structurally,
and not just semantically, distinct. The unergative
verb jump, which has an Agent, would have the
representation on the left, while the unaccusative fall,
which lacks an Agent, would have the structure on the
right. In English, this structural difference is masked
for independent reasons (see below), however, in
other languages, numerous grammatical distinctions
are dependent on this difference, including the kind
of auxiliary that the verb appears with, the possible
positions for the noun phrase, and the behavior
of pronominal elements in clause structure (see the
introduction to Ref 73 for review of the phenomena).
There is also processing evidence for the distinction
from different experimental paradigms.74–76
Syntactic Dependencies
Expressions of human language have a constituent
structure and there is evidence for the shape of that
structure and for how it interacts with meaning. We
now turn to the dependencies that hold between con-
stituents. These dependencies are crucial for deter-
mining various aspects of both form and meaning.
We will distinguish first between form-related and
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position-related dependencies. The first arises when
one constituent influences the pronounced form of
another, and the second when one element in structure
requires another element to be in a certain position
with respect to it. We then turn to meaning-related
dependencies, where constituent structure constrains
what meanings are available for relating constituents
within a structure.
Form Related Dependencies
We have already encountered a form-related depen-
dency in Why Is Syntactic Theory Relevant to Cogni-
tive Science?—agreement. Agreement is a systematic
covariation in the linguistic forms of two or more ele-
ments. However, care must be taken as to what we
mean by ‘form’ here. In English examples like (25),
it is not the formal plural marking on girls (i.e. the
-s) that covaries with the form of the verb, but rather
a more abstract property of this word, which is inter-
preted as semantic plurality. (25c) shows that the form
of the word is not relevant (as the word ‘sheep’ does
not change its form to mark whether it is singular
or plural). It is also not obvious that it is the mean-
ing that is conditioning the agreement, unless we take
electronic scales to be semantically plural.77 In other
languages, as we will see directly, appeal to meaning
is not sufficient to explain agreement.
(25) a. The girls are singing.
b. *The girl are singing
c. The sheep is/are bleating.
d. The electronic scales are broken.
A grammatically relevant property of a word or
other linguistic expression is called a (syntactic) fea-
ture: we say that the number feature on the noun
(marking its semantics as singular or plural) covaries
with a number feature on the verb, which is responsi-
ble for the form of the verb.
As well as subject verb agreement, languages
also display agreement of the verb with objects. For
example, the finite verb in the Nakh-Daghestanian
language Tsez agrees, in the usual case, with the noun
class of its objectb
(26) eniy-a¯ ziya b-išer-si
mother cow fed
‘The mother fed the cow.’ (Polinsky and
Potsdam78)
Cow in Tsez is a class III noun. Notice the b- at
the start of the verb, and compare with (27), where the
object is girl, a class II noun, and the verb is instead
prefixed with y. This is evidence of an agreement
dependency between the verb and its object sensitive
to the class feature of the object.
(27) eniy-a¯ kid y-išer-si
mother girl.II II-fed
‘The mother fed the girl.’
Some languages allow both subject and object
agreement, and in others, agreement can appear for
three arguments of a verb.
Another important set of syntactic dependencies
involving form are case-dependencies. Take the fol-
lowing sentences in English:
(28) a. He saw her.
b. *Him saw her
c. *She saw he
d. She saw him.
Here the form of the pronoun is apparently
dependent on its syntactic position. The traditional
notion of ‘case’ captures this: nouns and pronouns
come in different shapes which are dependent on a
case feature they bear, and this case feature is depen-
dent on the syntax. In the examples above, the forms
he, she are nominative while the forms her, him are
accusative. It turns out that it is not possible to asso-
ciate case features with meanings directly (as is shown
by comparing She bit me versus She was bitten, where
the same case (nominative) appears with different
semantic roles (Agent and Non-Agent, respectively).
At least some case phenomena are connected to struc-
ture not to semantics.
Position Related Dependencies
In addition to these dependencies of form, we also
see dependencies of position, where one element (usu-
ally a head) requires the presence of another particu-
lar element in a structurally local position. One such
dependency is subcategorization (often called comple-
ment selection). For example, a verb like hit requires
an object: Lilly hit the mouse versus *Lilly hit. More-
over the object has to be a certain syntactic category
(in this case a noun phrase: cf. *Lilly hit that Anson
sneezed, or compare I depend on you/ *I depend you).
Subcategorization dependencies are known to be psy-
chologically very salient, to bear a close but indirect
relationship to verb meanings,79 but to be not entirely
reducible to meaning.80 To see this consider:
(29) a. I asked the time.
b. I asked what the time was.
c. *I inquired the time
d. I inquired what the time was.
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Here the verbs ‘ask’ and ‘inquire’ both combine
with a complement whose meaning is a question,
giving (29b) and (29d). However, only ‘ask’ can
combine with a noun phrase object which has a
question meaning, so (29c) is semantically reasonable
but lower in acceptability than the other examples.
This pattern suggests that there is a role for purely
syntactic information that specifies the kind of object
a verb requires (noun phrase or sentence), presumably
learned as a feature of the verb in addition to the verb’s
meaning.
In our discussion of unaccusative and unergative
verb classes, we saw that there was good linguistic
and processing evidence for two structural positions:
unaccusative verbs’ single argument is the sister of the
verb, while unergatives’ is higher in the structure, the
specifier of v. This is a subcategorizational difference
in verb class: unaccusatives like fall, which have
no Agent, take their single argument as an object,
unergatives like jump take their argument as the
specifier of v. However, looking again at the trees in
(24), one might expect the object in the unaccusative
to occur after the verb, since verb–object is the
general order in the English verb phrase; but this is
not what we find. Subjects of both unergatives and
unaccusatives precede the verb:
(30) a. The cat jumped.
b. The cat fell.
The reason for this is another positional depen-
dency, but this time one that is purely syntactic: in
English the specifier of T must be filled by some con-
stituent. Syntacticians call this position the structural
subject position. This generalization about English
grammar is motivated by a simple observation: sen-
tences in English never lack a structural subject:
(31) a. (I know that) a cat is in the lavender.
b. (I know that) there is a cat in the lavender.
c. *(I know that) is a cat in the lavender
d. It is 4 o’clock. /*is 4 o’clock
(31b) requires the ‘dummy’ word there to be in the
position before the auxiliary verb is as we can see in
(31c). Similarly, (31d) requires the pronoun it. The
generalization can be stated as:
(32) The structural subject position (i.e. the specifier-
of T) must be filled in English.
This generalization does not hold in other lan-
guages (it is a point of syntactic variation) and whether
it has a deeper explanation is a question of some
controversy. There are also exceptions (for example,
imperatives, like leave now!) although these are the
result of well-understood interfering factors.
However, taking this generalization to be true
for English, we now have an explanation for why the
surface orders of unaccusatives and unergatives is the
same in English. Even though the two verb phrases
are distinct in structure, this difference is obliterated,
because (32) requires the single noun phrase in each
structure to appear in the structural subject position.
There are, then, two selectional requirements here: one
in the verb phrase where the interpretation of the noun
phrase as an Agent or not is determined, and the other
higher in the sentence, where requires there to be a
structural subject. These two selectional requirements
can both be met by taking the phrase the cat to be
in both structural positions simultaneously, giving the
following representations:
(33)
T
NP
the cat
T
T[past] v
NP
the cat
v
v jumped[V]
T
NP
the cat
T
T[past] v
v V
fell[V] NP
the cat
In English, the higher of the two the cats is pro-
nounced, so the surface order is the same. These sim-
ple examples have two types of positional dependency
relations: a dependency between the verb and its argu-
ment, which has a semantic effect, and a distributional
regularity of English that requires a structural subject,
and hence has an effect on word order.
This phenomenon, where a single pronounced
item enters into two (or more) dependencies in a
structure is very common, and it is often termed
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‘movement’ or ‘displacement’. The appropriate theo-
retical implementation of this phenomenon is contro-
versial, but is orthogonal to its existence, and ubiquity,
in languages of the world.
Meaning-Related Dependencies
An interesting meaning-related dependency which has
a structural correlate involves what are called bound
variable effects. The following example has two dis-
tinct meanings:
(34) Every kitten wanted its food.
The most salient meaning is that kitten A wants
the food that belongs to kitten A, while kitten B wants
the food that belongs to kitten B etc. This is the
bound variable reading, as it can be represented in
(Anglicized) predicate logic (35) as, where the variable
x is bound by the quantifier every:
(35) For every x, where x is a kitten, x wants x’s food.
The other meaning is that there is some other
individual (say a puppy) whose food we are talking
about:
(36) a. The puppy tore into the steak it had stolen.
Every kitten wanted its food.
b. There is some y (a puppy) and for every x,
where x is a kitten, x wants y’s food.
When we change the structural relationship
between the phrase every kitten and the pronoun
its, the bound variable reading vanishes (or at least
becomes much less accessible).
(37) Its food was in every kitten’s bowl.
This phenomenon is highly complex, and struc-
tural conditions are possibly only part of what is going
on,81 although the current consensus position is that
the structural relation of c-command, a kind of exten-
sion of sisterhood, is implicated (see sidebar).
Another case where we see bound variable
effects (and c-command) is reflexives, words like her-
self in English. Consider:
(38) Lilly impresses herself.
The meaning of this requires the two arguments
of the verb impress to be construed as the same
individual. That is, the verb phrase impresses herself
means something like x, such that x impresses x, where
we fill in the variable x with the meaning of the noun
Lilly. We see a similar effect with the expression each
other:
(39) Lilly and Jasper impressed each other
Here the verb phrase means something like x and
y, such that x impresses y and y impresses x.
C-COMMAND
The syntactic relation mentioned in the text is
called c-command (for constituent command)
and can be deﬁned as follows13:
(i) A constituent X c-commands a constituent Y if,
and only if,
(a) X’s sister is Y, or
(b) X’s sister contains Y
Take (ii), for example:
(ii) A
B
C D
E
C’s sister neither is E nor contains E, so C
does not c-command E. E’s sister however is B and
B contains C, so E c-commands C.
There are structural conditions on recovering
this kind of meaning from sentences, and again
c-command seems to be relevant. One important view
takes the generalization to be as follows:
(40) The expression which supplies the meaning to a
reflexive c-commands the reflexive.
It then correctly follows that (41) cannot mean
that Lilly is such that her father impresses Lilly, since
the word Lilly does not c-command the reflexive her-
self . I have placed brackets in to mark the constituent
structure:
(41) *[ [ [ Lilly’s ] father ] [ impresses herself ] ]
In this example, the phrase that c-commands her-
self is Lilly’s father, and since that phrase is gram-
matically masculine, and herself is grammatically
feminine, no bound variable interpretation is possi-
ble, leading to unacceptability.82 In contrast, in Lilly
impresses herself , the subject Lilly c-commands the
reflexive, and so can supply the relevant meaning.
Another case where we find a bound variable
semantics is resumptive pronouns. These are found
in many language families (Celtic, Semitic, Kru, Ger-
manic, Polynesian), and appear in structures that look
as follows (the following is Irish, from McCloskey,83
example 10) with the rough literal translation given:
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(42) Céacu fear ar labhair tú leis
Which man that talked you to-him?
literally: ‘Which man did you talk to him?’
The meaning of this question is roughly: for
which x, where x is a man, is it the case that you talked
to x. The pronoun him and the constituent which
man are construed together, giving us a bound variable
semantics. McCloskey (2006) provides a survey of the
empirical range of resumptive pronoun structures and
their theoretical analysis.
The equivalent of (42) in English is of course
(43a), with further examples of the construction in
(b-c):
(43) a. Which man did you talk to?
b. Which girl did the cat scratch?
c. What scratched the girl?
These also have a bound variable reading, but
there is no pronoun or other overt element to mark
the position of the variable. Instead there is simply the
absence of any phrase, often termed a gap. This same
pattern appears inmany distinct places in the grammar
of English and other languages. (44) shows it also in
relative clauses and topicalizations, where there is a
gap where the object of the verb catch would usually
be (a much wider range of cases can be given here84):
(44) a. The mouse that the cat caught died.
b. That mouse, the cat will never catch.
One possible analysis is that there is an unpro-
nounced pronoun in the position of the object, so
that English works just like a language with resump-
tive pronouns. However, both linguistic and experi-
mental evidence has shown that gaps in English do
not behave like resumptives either linguistically83,85 or
experimentally.86,87
The construction exemplified in (43) is called a
constituent question, since the constituent at its begin-
ning is the focus of the question. This construction has
spawned a vast literature because of the linguistic and
processing issues that it raises. It is found in matrix
clauses and also in embedded clauses:
(45) Guess which girl the cat scratched!
In many languages, the constituent that is ques-
tioned is specially marked; in English the relevant
marking often involves words containing wh, hence
the other name for these questions: wh-questions.
Recall the generalization (32), that requires a
subject to appear in the specifier of T, holds in
English. A similar generalization holds in English for
constituent questions, presented here in a somewhat
simplified form:
(46) In a constituent question in English, a wh-
constituent has to appear in the specifier
of C.
Evidence for this comes from the ungrammati-
cality of examples like the following where there is no
wh-constituent to the left of the C position and the
object which girl is in the normal object position, sis-
ter to the verb (compare with example (43-b) and (45),
respectively):
(47) a. *Did the cat scratch which girl?
b. *Guess the cat scratched which girl!
The tree for (45) is then:
(48)
V
guess C
which girl C
C T
the cat T
T[past] V
scratched which girl
Here scratch subcategorizes for an object, but
in this case the speaker has chosen to ask a question
about that object, so it is marked as a wh-phrase,
and the generalization in (46) requires it to appear in
the specifier of C, hence it is pronounced to the left
of the sentence. Just as we saw with the structural
subject position in English, the relevant constituent
enters into two distinct positional dependencies (each
with an associated semantics in this case), and only the
higher of the two constituents is pronounced, giving a
movement/displacement phenomenon.
The generalization about wh-constituents does
not, however, apply to all languages. Many languages
(e.g. Japanese, Chinese) leave the wh constituent in its
position inside the sentence, so we have sentences like
the following in Japanese, where the wh-constituent
remains in the same position it would be in if it were
just a simple object (to the left of, and sister to, the
verb):
142 © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Cognitive Science published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 6, March/Apr i l 2015
WIREs Cognitive Science Syntax
(49) Taroo-wa nani-o kaimasita ka?
Taro what bought Q
‘What did Taro buy?’
Here the complementizer that marks the sen-
tence as a question is at the end of the sentence, and
is marked just with a Q in the gloss: but the hierarchy
is the same as English, although the order is partially
reversed, and the wh-constituent stays in the object
position. Japanese is said to set two syntactic param-
eters differently from English: (i) one parameter is the
order of the complements of C, T and V, and (ii) the
other is the lack of a requirement that the specifier of
C is filled in a wh-question:
(50)
C
T
Taroo T
V
what buy
past
C[Q]
One final point about bound variable depen-
dencies is important. Although they are structurally
restricted, they appear to be unbounded:
(51) Which problem did you intuit [ that Anson
would say [ his administrator would persuade
[ Morag to solve ] ] ]?
Here the gap to be associated with which prob-
lem is separated from it by three clauses (marked in
the example with brackets). Although memory issues
quickly intervene, no one has ever established a sys-
tematic limit on how many sentence boundaries this
wh-dependency can cross, and the class of depen-
dencies that work this way are often referred to
as unbounded dependencies (or long-distance depen-
dencies). However, there is linguistic evidence that
the C position after each verb c-commanded by the
wh-phrase (in this case, intuit, say, persuade, solve)
is part of the dependency88–90 and experimental evi-
dence that the human sentence processor posits a
gap in these positions.91 This has been taken as evi-
dence that apparently long-distance dependencies like
this are composed of a series of shorter dependencies
strung together.92
Connected to this issue, even long distance
dependencies are subject to certain locality effects93
known as Island Conditions. For example, although
a wh-constituent may link to its gap over intervening
sentences, it may not if the intervening sentence is itself
a subject, or is inside a noun phrase. In (52), that Lilly
scratched Anson is the subject of the verb surprise, but
it is impossible to make a constituent question where
the object of scratch appears as the specifier of C; in
(53), the object the mouse contains a modifying sen-
tence (a relative clause) which itself contains a further
constituent Anson. Again, this constituent cannot be
syntactically questioned:
(52) a. [ That Lilly scratched Anson ] surprised
David.
b. *Who did that Lilly scratched surprise David
(53) a. Lilly caught [ the mouse that Jasper brought
Anson ]
b. *Who did Lilly catch the mouse that Jasper
brought.
There are many Island configurations, and an
enormous amount of work has gone into understand-
ing their nature, their cross-linguistic validity, and
their explanation.94–96 Whether they are to be under-
stood as emerging from the structure of the grammar92
or from the structure of other cognitive processes
(such as the sentence processor97) is a current topic
of debate98), but the empirical phenomenon is robust
and clearly important to cognitive science as a whole.
This section has sketched only a very few of
the most important kinds of syntactic dependencies
found in human language. Others involve obligatory
interpretation of the arguments of different predicates
as the same entity, as in (54a), where the understood
subject of catch is interpreted as identical to the
subject of attempt; apparent anti-dependencies where
a pronoun and a noun phrase cannot be construed as
the same (as she and Lilly in (54b)); and cases where
there is a single wh constituent, but multiple gaps,
as in (54c), where which mouse is understood as the
object of both scratch and ate. Of course, these are
just examples from English, while research in syntax
investigates how or if they appear in other languages
and what consequences the variation and uniformity
across languages has for understanding the nature of
the human syntactic capacity.
(54) a. Lilly attempted to catch the mouse.
b. She didn’t understand that Lilly was sleepy.
c. Which mouse did Lilly scratch before she ate?
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CONCLUSIONS
We began by divorcing syntax from the more gen-
eral functions of language, but it is clear that syntactic
research can shed some light on these more general
questions. Structure, after all, both enhances and con-
strains function. The system that generates constituent
structures enriches human cognitive and communica-
tive abilities by providing us with an unbounded
range of structures connecting sound with meaning
and helping to explain why humans outstrip other
species in this domain; discoveries about the posi-
tions andmeanings of functional categories across lan-
guages and how these categories influence the shape
and meanings of syntactic structures provide evidence
for how language relates to more general categories
of thought, such as agency, time, and objecthood; the
discovery that units of syntax may enter into a num-
ber of dependencies simultaneously and how these
dependencies are realized in different ways in different
languages has provided new ways of thinking about
what is universal versus what is variable in human
cognition and hence what is subject to change over
generations. Decades of syntactic research have uncov-
ered not only a huge wealth of knowledge about how
human language works in the domain of syntax, but
have also provided cognitive science with theoretical
models of this apparently unique aspect of human
nature.
NOTES
a When I present material from languages other
than English, I will usually suppress technical infor-
mation in the gloss, on the assumption that most read-
ers will be interested in the patterns rather than the
specifics of the data. For those interested, the refer-
ences provide the source and example numbers of the
data.
b Noun classes in Tsez are only roughly semantically
determined, with class I being male humans, class II
being female humans, plus a number of inanimate
nouns, class III including all animals and a large set
of inanimates, and class IV being inanimate nouns.
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